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Sugar has been as a major earner of foreign exchange for the
Philippi,_,.. economy since the early part of the twentieth century.
During _:h,, 19hO's, for example, sugar exports made up 18 percent
of total _Jxporr.earnings (Table I). SugarTs share of export
_arning_ has been declining, however, due both to increasing domestic
sugar consumption and growth in other exports, in the 1950's, sugar
was roughly 22 percent of total exports, but by the late 1970's,
sugar's share of totai exports had declined to only i0 percent
(Table I).
The predominance of sugar in Philippine trade was largely the
result of coloniai and post-colonial ties with the United States.
Until _974, almost all Philippine sugar was sold duty free into the
protected United States market where prices were kept stable at.
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Qua_=ity and Value of Philippine Exports of Centrifugal and Refined Sugar
(000 metric tens and million U.S. dollars)
I_ORTERS Share of Su_a
TOTAL SUGAR CENTRALLY PLANNED in Total
YEAR EXPORTS U.S. JAPAN ECONOMIES OT_ERS Exports
Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value (percent.
1
1955-1959 864 I01 839 98 8 1 - - 17 2 25
1960-19641 _1,032 140 1,032 140 ..... - 19
I i
i965_ 1969 _ 984 i44 984 144 ...... 18
I
1970-1974 1,383 325 1,3!7 286 51 33 ,- - 15 7 21
1975 972 581 329 1'47 476 324 II. 9 156" 107 25
1976 1,466 429 961 285 9i 28 333 97 81 19 !7
1977 2,442 512 1__/,234 278 237 50 892 166 79 18 16
1978 i,124 197 626 II0 62 I0 199 35 237 42 6
1979 i,150 212 405 75 347 63 [38 24 260 50 5
1980 I,735 624 415 151 363 137 382 113 575 223 ii
Source: National Economic and.Development Authority, Foreisn Trade statistics of the Philippines,
National Census and Statistics Office_ various years._;CN 3
levels usually well above the world market. Philippine policies were
in large measure designed to secure maximum benefits from these
arrangements.
Preferential access to the U.S. marke_ ended in 1974, precipi-
tating a major change in Philippine policies° The government took
over control of both domestic and international marketing, justifying
this as a way of protecting producers and consumers from world price
fluctuations and improving the Philippine negotiating position in
world markets. Both before and after 1974, sugar production,
processing and trade has always been closely regulated by the govern-
ment. These regulations have included/export taxes_ an import ban,
price, production, and marketing contro]s_ low interest rates on
production and equipment loans_ and special minimum wages. A major
goal of this paper is to examine the impact of these policies on
sugar production and trade.
In addition to trade, sugar is a highly visible consumer good
and its domestic price, along with those of rice and cooking oil, is
a barometer of the success of government efforts to control inflation,
A second goal of this paper is to examine the effect of government
policies on domestic prices and therefore the distribution of income
from sugar production and processing.
It has been argued that the cost of producing sugar in the
Philippines is high relative to other major exporters (FEER).
What is not mentioned is the extent to which the high costs reflect4
GCN
social opportunity costs of the inputs or the impact .of govern_nt
policies such as mi_limum wages, credit subsidies and Price controls.
If the costs are not due pri:marily tO government policies, and are
greater than long run sugmr prices, a stro[_g case can be made for
encouraging _rginal Rroducers to shift out of sugar. A third
goal of the paper is to examine comparativeadvantage in production._N 5
WORLDTRADE IN SUGAR
Because international trade is _o.important to.Philippine
sugar, i.tis usefulto discuss briefly the characteristics of the
international sugar market_ International free market prices of suga_
are notorious for fluctuating wildly and the decade of the 1970's
provides a •good example (Figure I). From a low of $81 per metric ton
in"l.970, the world price•climbed steadily to .a peak of $552 in 1974,
and thendropped back to only $i71 in 1978. A rapid increase
followed and by 1980, prices•were over• $600 per metric, ton. An
equally rapid decline followed and in 1981, prices fell to an average
of 8390. In 1982, free market sugar •prices remained near a
decade low of about $lgO per metric ton.
Two factors account for chis fluctuation, Relativeto ether
commodities_ a large share of internationally traded sugar is xkot
sold at free marke_ prices° Only about 70 percent of •sugar traded
internationally is sold on the free market amd this includes sugar
sold at prices below production c•osts.I In addition_ domestic sugar
production and consumption in many countries are.protected from world
price fluctuations bygovernment price control, forcing domestic
production variation onto the world market. For example, the EC sets
adomestic floor price well above the free market price in most years • ,
purchases•excess production, and sells it at a loss i.n the world
market.. It also has large preferential _mports from Frevious colonies
of member countries and as a result, is the second or third largestGCN 7
importer and the second or third largest net exporter of sugar.
Although the Philippine share of world area devoted to sugar
is only two percent, it has been consistently one of the top four
or five exporters, supplying •about five percent of all exported
sugar. Until the end of its preferential trade with the U.S. in
1974, essentiaily all Philippine sugar was exported to the U.S. Since
1974, expert markets have been diversified•and in 1980, exports to
the U.$. were only 25 percent of the total. Japan took a little
over 20 percent, and the centrally planned economies bought somewhat
less than 20 percent.8
]_ILIPPII_ SUGARPRICE _ICIES
In the post World War 'II period, there he*re boen thr_ dist.inct
policy environment.s--from the tw_d of the _ _o 1962 _mn an o_sr-
_ued peso rechtcml tb_ d_Irability of e_rti_8,. 1962 to 1974
t_ devaluations stud an increame in U.S. q_ot_8 ga_ _q_ort quota
holders larae profits, and 197& to the present _ _ 8ovmrnwmlt
took direct coutrol of domestic and iuternational _rketin8. In each
of these periods, s_z _ms &fluted Dot c_ly by po1_i_ d£_etly
affecti_8 s_arp b_ 81so by polleiee d_r_c_ed to_ti_Is agri_l_e
8mmrally, s_b as credit and fer_ili=er st_£_ies, and by tm_:r_c
po,licies e_h as the o_raIZ attar#re of p_otec_:i_n. I_£e lectioa
deals privately _rith price, m_r_ti_ reed foreia_ .e_e poiic:i_s.
A &is_umio_ of the _t of p_l£oi_s e_t_ _uCs ie tlefer_ed
_o s _at_ smcti_.
T_ poet _r poliey _v_romt _s b_- strongly i_fl_ced
by p_e _mr &v_rlop_.te, aed _ b_-lef loo_ b_c._rd _lps to _-
_s_d e_rent policies, 2 B_ea 191_ and 193_ _£!il_p_e e_
_te_d U._. _s_kets _y fr_ stud _- _r_rlct_ q_,stiti_s, _s a
t_t_It, l_il_ppi.e proc1_e_ic_,a:_t _11 of _ieb we_s fo_r export,
_rm_<_Idly. .q_ports reached e _k of i. 3 miili,_a to_ im 193_, a
that _ _ot exceeded _ntil _1971 (_uke, 1'963 ). In 1935,
til_ U.8. _hemged _he str_tt_ee _f proteet£on gi_e_ _o domestic 8_Ear¢_N 9
from high tariff barriers to quantitative limits o_ imports,
Philippine sugar was provided a quota of only 850,000 tons_ two-
thirds of its previous frec trade exports to the U_S.
The primary goals of Philippine pre-World War II regulation
were to distribute the export quot_ for the U._. market among
domestic producers and to maintain the price of domestic sugar. The
principal legisl_tion, the Sugar Limitation Law of 1934, set up the A_41_
basic mechanisms which regulated sugar production, processing, and
trade for most of the next 48 years. Each mill and grower was given
a share of the U.S. export quota (called the A quota). A second
quantity, the B quota, was set aside for sale to the domestic market.
A small reserve (the C quota) was also set up to m_et unforseen needs.
Both the A and B quotas were maximum amounts that a producer could
se!l into the respective mgrkets, The _um of all A quotas was equal
to the U.S. quota. The sum of all B quot_s was equal to domestic sT_ply,
and was set to keep domestic consumer prices at a predetermined level.
Each mill owner and producer was free to trade sugar domestically and
in the export market up to the ii=_it of his respective A and B quotas.
The need for the A quota is clear. Under t_e provisions of
the agreement with the U.S., the quantity of exports that could be
shipped to the U.S. umrket was limited and the A quotas allocated
_he U.S. quota among domestic producers.
The original goal of the B quotas was to =_intain domeatic
prices. In 1935 when the quota arrangement with th_ U.S. was
implemented, Philippine exports to the U.S. were about 400,000_ tonsCCN 10
greater than the quota. Since domestic consumption wa._ only lO0,OOO
_ons (8uke, 1963), the i_pact oi diverting the excess to the domestic
market would have been to cause a drastic fall in domestic priees_
To prevent tbis, producers were paid a one time f_e to destroy part
of their standing cane (_S_, May' 1980), and production and
domestic sales restrictions imposed.
POST WAR POLICIES TO 1962
Sugar plantations and processing, facilities suffered m_stantial
d_mage during World War II, and i_ediate post war production was well
below pre war peaks. Furthermore_ the exchange rate wam frozen at
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two pesos per dollar, a rate that overvalued the peso (Baldwin_ 1975).
Until the 1962 de'valuation, U.S. and domestic prices w_re roughly the
_ame, and Were 40 percent higher than the werld prJ.ce (Table 3). The
overvaluation reduced incentive to export sugar to the U._S.
Philippine exports to the U.S. _ere below export quota_ in several
years ¢_ring "the period (Table 2), and there were small exports to
Japan.
During this period, explicit domestic price ceilil!:gs were
introduced. However, since export (U.$.) and do_stic prices were
at the same level and the export quota was-not always met_ there
was little need to enforce _trictly either prod_JEc:tl.on co_trols or
price regulations.GC_ iI
TABI.E 2
United States Quota on Philippine Sugar and Actual
Philippine Exports
(000 metric tons, cormuercial weight I)
Actual Phi l.ipp in@ e.i_.p_r ts6
Year U.S. Qu,9_t,. _ to the United _tates
19552 863.6 890.6
1956_ 863.6 870.6
1957_ 863° 6 630,: 7
_ _ _ 8 _ 063" _I S 92 . 5
1959_ 863.6 909 _i
1960"_ I,019.0 940.6
1961_ i,296i i 1,039-0
1962. !I :_i 116.5 979_4
1963_ I,099.5 1,081.1
1964_ _i if, Oi._ . 3 1,119.5
1965. J !,159.8 I,122. S
i966. _ !,123.A 941_ 7
X 9 6 7 ? l'O_ 'I} 942.7
1968_ 1,055.5 904.4
19694 ! , 0 5 1 _ 5 ]I _ 0 1 0 . 5
1970. 1,214.9 l,236,2
19/I_ _ 1,413. l 1,421.4
!972_ I]. , 2 "_._ . 4 1,239.0
I973 :_ I,295.4 I_410,7
,Note_: I. Sugar sta_iIstics that .include _=th raw or rmfined _Iga_" _i_' 4J_
reported either in commercial weight or raw value. Com_ercial
weight is simply the su_= cf the tonnages of both types cf _.ugar_
In fig,_res reported in raw value te_nns, refined sugar is
converted to its raw equivalent. The convermion rate depends
upon the degree of purity of the refined sugar but is roughly
equal to 1.05.
2. Niceto S. Poblador (1964), "The Philippine Sugar Industry: A
Case Study of Government Control, _' _!#_;_kLi_lip_._,D_@._<_v'iewof
Business and_,E__conom_cs, Volume I:.Number 2, October. The raw
_alue equivalent is 980,000 short to_,s.
3. _hili_ine Sugar Handbook_ July 1974,
4. S_gar News_ February 1972. These figure_ were reported in
raw _a!ue and have been converted to _o_merc_al weight
equivalent a_ a rate of 10,0294,
6. From Table l,GC_ 12
Cont. of Table 2.
Statistics on the United States quota on sugar are complicated
in a n,,mber of ways. The quota provided for import_ of both raw and
refined sugar, in addition, the quota was usually expressed long
tons. but ie sometimes referred to in short tons or in metric tons.
Finally, in additio, to the basic export tonnage, which was increaeed
occasionally, the Philippines was provided a share in the gz_'¢th of
United States consumption above a cert:_in level as well as a share
in quota shortfalls of other countries. This table p_eseuts figures
which are reasonably close to whaC the actual quota was, but should
not be viewed as exact.C_N i3
POLICIESBETWEEN !962AND 1974
The direct impact of the devaluatio_1 of the peso between
1960 and 1962 was to raise substantially the peso price of sugar
exported to the U.S. relative to the Phi!ippine consumer ;rice,
B_tween 1960 and i962, export unit values doubled while _he Manila
wholesale price increased less than 50 p.ercent. A second devaluation
and imposition of a I0 percent export tax in 1970 further widened
the gap between consumer and export prices and during the period
1962 to 1973, the export, price was 30 percent higher _han the
consumer price on average.
Philippine access to the U.S. _rket increased when the Cuban
quota was eliminated in 1.960 and its share allocated amon_ other
qt_o£a holders. Between 1.959and 1962, the quota was increased
rou@_ly 25 percent (250,000 tons commercial weight) and by 1974
another 200,000 tons had been added. V.naddition, domestic .con-
sumptlon was rising steadily. Average annu, l domestic con_,umption
(production less exports) was 355,00Q tons in 1955-60, h,._t had
increased to 652.,000 tons in the 1969-1973 period_
The combination of increased pe_o prices for exports and
growth in the export quota-made axporting mole attractive that it
had been before 1962. At the same time, growth in population and
income increased domestic demar_d. Substantially higher domestic
prices were politically undesirable and i_p_/ts at the lower freeGCN 14
market price were impossible, if this U.S. quota were to be main-
tained. A combination of increases in B quotas with moderate
domestic price increases was chosen as the way to meet domestic
demand. Producers were required to allocate 30 percent of their
weekly production to the domestic market (B quota-sugar) until their B
quotas was filled. If they did not meet their domestic quota in a
given year, sales in the next year went entirely to the domestic
market until the previous year_s quota was filled. In essence,
export sales became a residual market. The domestic market was
satisfied before exports were allowef. An important effect was that
between 1962 and 1973, exports to the U.S. were below 95 percent of
the quota in 4 out of 12 years (Table 2).
IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES BETWEEN 1955 AND 1974
A comparison of world and U.S. domestic prices indicates that
for almost all of the period between 1955 and 1974, U.S. prices were well
above the world price (Table 3 and Figure 2). Duty free access to
the protected U.S. market allowed Philippine producers to earn
substantially more on exports than if they could sell only to the
world market.
At the official exchange rate, domestic: prices were roughly
equal to export (U.S.) prices until 1961, but from 1962 on Philippine
consumer prices were below export unit values but above worl_ prices. _
With devaluation and the increased U.S. export quota, a wedge wasGCN 15
TABLE 3
Nominal Tariff Rates, Implicit Tariffs, and
Related Sugar Price Ratios, 1955 to 1980
(percent)
1955-1961 1962-1973 1974-!980
Nominal tariff rate I 65 7q -,%.5
Implicit tariff 2 6_ 39 -31
U.S. to world 71 )06 29
Philippine export to world 63 |02 - 3
Philippine export to U.S° -5 4 -2
Wholesale Manila to
export -2 -32 -18
Millgate to export _ -17 -20
Source: Calculations based on the appendix table.
I. The nominal protection rate is based on the ratio of the
millga£e price to the world price. The prices are not
at the same point in the marketing chain and these figures
overstate the protection provided to producers.
2. The im_,_licittariff is based on the ratio of the wholesale
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introduced betwee_ export and consu_ner prices_ In order to protect
consumers from a sharp rise in sugar prices, producers were required
to sell a portion of their production into the domestic market in
order to export. As a result_ consumer prices increased much less
than Export prices.
Producer incomes depended upon the level of the export and
domestic prices, the shares which they were allowed to semi into
each market_ and the extent to which domestic production was sufficient
to meet both quotas.
In Figure 3, DD' is the domestic demand curve, SS' is the
domestic supply curve (the marginal cost curve), S-_S is the domestic
supply curve less the U,S. quota, QUS" PUS and PW are U_S. CIF and
world free market prices respectively. If the only domestic policies
were the import ban and the export quota_ the domestic price would
he P'D ahd domestic consumption would be QA" Producers would earn
PUS QUS + PD QA ACB QB (ACB average cost of production at
quantity B), consumers would pay (P_ - PW ) QA more for the sugar
they consumed than if that susar were imported at the free market
5
price.
In addition to the export quota and import ban, however_ the
government had a domestic price ceiling which it met by forcin_
producers to sell in the domestic market before they were allowed to
export, In Figure 4, SS W is again the domestic supply curve and
$ - QD is the domestic supply curve less the domestic quota. GivenFIGURE 3
Demand fo_ and Supply of Philippine Sugar, 1962-!973
._-Qus
l
_A Q_ QGCN 17
the ban on imports, the domestic quota_ and the price of exports
6
(PUS), producers want to produce QTOT and export _S"
If the U.S. quota is equal to EUS, the system is in equilibrium
and one of the quotas is redundant. If the U.S. quota is greater
than _S' itwill not be _t because producers mu_t sell first to
the domestic market. If the U.S, quota is less than _S' the export
quotas become binding and quota _ents are generated. 7
During this period, three factors acted to move the system
OUt of equillbrium--growing domestic demand, increases in the U.S.
quota, and outward, shifts in the supply curve due both to techno.
logical .changes and input cost reducing policies such as credit
and fertilizer subsidies. Domestic demand growth shifts S-QD to
the left, while supply factors shift SS _ and therefore S-Q D tO
the right. It is not p0ssibla to observe periods when _S was. :
greater than the U.S. quota and quota rents were generated, but
in four years between I962 and 1974, exports ware less than 95
percent of the U.S. quota, an indication that EUS was less than the
u.s.q.ot.
Four general income distribution or producti_ effects of
these policieE can be seen. First, U.S. consumers paid more to
Philippine producers than if theyhad imported from the free.market;
there was a revenue transfer from U.S. consumer_ to Philippine
producers. Between 1955 and 1973, this amount averaged $53
million per year (1972 dollars), second, Philippine con-
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price had prevailed'in _he Philipp_.ne_° This l_ss ef consumer
surplus was roughly $I0 million per yea_ (1972 dollars). Third,
domestic production expanded beyond what wculd have been privately
profitab!_ i.f the world p_ice had prevailed. Finally, producers
with better than average lands earned excess profits and in some
years all producers earned quota rent_oGCN 19
PHILIPPINE SUGAR POLICIES" 1974 TO 1982
The end of preferential access to 'theU.S. m_rk.et in. 1973
led to a major change in Philippine sugar policies. Before 1974,
the government had allocated domestic and export quotas_ butallowed
the private trade to handle the marketing, in response to the
termination of the Laurel-Langley Act_ the Philippine Exchange
Company, Incorporated (Philex), an agency of the Philippine National
Bank (the major financial institution for the sugar industry at
that time), was designated the sole buyer of sugar from the sugar
mills and the sole exporter of sugar._
In contrast to the previous system inwhich each mill was
responsible for marketing its export and domestic quotas, Philex
bought all sugar at a single "composite" price--calculated by
taking weighted shares of the officially determined "export" (A),
"domestic" (B), and "reserve" (C) prices (Table _).9 Philex
sold sugar for the domestic market to licensed traders and exported
the remainder itself.
The end of the U.S. quota system coincided with record high
world prices for sugar and the problems of adjusting to the new
situation were tempo_arily postponed° Because world prices were
so high, an additional export tax was implemented_ 0 and a temporary
ban on exports was declared in late 1974 to protect domestic
C0.$ UR_ rS,-:" ...... 20
C "'" .v:xp_t Unie Vai,_e o.f _uaar 197_ to 1982 ,,omposl_ Price ar_ " r ......" .
I'.;'<:._:_)pos:_.,te .Price A%;'e-i_'a_e Ex_,ort
,!i!'_ t_'L ._i./SY.<?II::_:: i!i!!'!;!; (_'/ p _cu I ) < _/k_. '; Un±_: 'i,,_l ue
(_+f'kg. _, calenc_a:F
'2¢ear)
25 October 197t_ 140..94 2 '_3 '_ _'_
5 P.;_:-4_' t9;5 _, )S .... _: '_',. i. 83 _. 3¢
:?.6 _Vlarch 1976 !0&.75 i. 72 2.17
2 D,_-_,.. ...... m1._.r--_ !!_76 79._6= " !.26 t.. 55";'
1.3 Dec,e_'_',,5,E' ;: )i !_ '.._ ;_': _,_ I.50 i,. 2_ i, 55'R
1 !_ay i9l7 90._:(_ i. 42 I.5.5
i J_nL,_=::, 1978 90.00 /E,42 ._.. >u
2 ' .: .r 'i 0"'a _,p_........ _,,- _. 20 (t23.5) I_57 '.._ ":_ :0" '; .... _" 1,36
1 Sep'_ember1980 &12,_";0 (145.0) i°78 (2_29) 2o58
...... " "_ ?9)
1 Feh_u_',, _ 1982 _68.80 2.6b
Source._ _At:..U'ICRA
Note: _:'_:;_:ure_, i_ _:,_:. ............ ,..L.th_.:..es" ' , _ , i.ncl_d;_.';, _.dd:i_ion,zl '*,,.avmen_ ...... to millers
and "" ...... _" _A_U_, .... '_:<cofits,. _)i.,._._,.er., as a _si_are:Of '_ ,.*,,r,,,...,,
"1977 'price.GCN
World sugar prices began falling i_ !975 and by 1977 were
only 27 percent of 1974 levels,, In response, the composite price
was lowered from 2.23_/kg_ (its original level) to i.28F/kg, in
December of 1976 and then increased to !.40P/kg_ in May 1977 where.
it remained until world prices began rising in J979.
De...spi_:e the reduction of the composite price_ expor-t unit values in
most of !977, 1978, and 1979_ were lower still. In order to maintain
producer prices above world prices, Phi!ex made large loans from
domestic and foreign banks in _977_ ]978_ and 1979. !I
Despite high world prices in 1973 and 1974 (or'perhaps because
of them), domestic _.tocks of sugar _ere built up and by 1975/76 had
reached a 1970's peak of I_68 million tons. 12 The next two years
saw record exports (most of the increase went to Russia and China)
and stocks were drawn down somawha*_. Unfortunately, these exports
came in years When world prices were at their lowest and export
revenues' did not increase nearly as mucL. as export quantity. As
a result cf the substantial losses in.:urred, government control of
sugar was transferred in i978 to a newly constituted policy making
body, the Philippine Sugar Co__mmission (Phiisucom) 13 and day to day
operations were given to the new National Sugar Trading Company
(NASUTEA).
Philsucom and NASUTRA were saddled with domestic s_ocks that
were '._tilllarge by historical standards and the need t6 rep_y t_he
large loans made previously. A fortuitous rise in world prices inGCN 22
1979 and 1980 allowed RASUTBA to draw down its stocks profitably
(exports in 1980 were the second largest ever recorded), and in
1980 NASUTRA entered.into long term contracts of three and four
yea_s to sell half of total exports at roughly 51.8 U.S. cents per
kg. (_3.7 per kg.). Although that price was o_ly half of the
highest price reached in the spot market in 1980, it proved to be
s remarkably goc_d bargain because world, prices fell to about 22
cents par kg. in 1981 and remained at or below that level through
1982.
As world prices began increasing in 1979_ composite prices
were raised, first in the middle of the 1978/79 crop year and then
• again in the beginniug of the 1979/80 crop year. In general,
Phi!sucom's price policy was to change the export price component
of the composite price with changes in the world price, Because
of the need to repay the loans, however, world price increases
were not fully passed through to producers. Fifty percent of
NASUTRAts profits were kept to pay off the loans (changed to 20
percent in December 1981) and fifty percent paid to planter_/
14
millers. By March 1981, the president of NASUTRA reported that
P1,5 billion of the loans (approximately 60 percent) had been
15
repaid (SuKar News, March 1981)._CN 23
'IMPACT O_ CURtLED_rSUGAR PRICE A_ _RICETINC POLICIES
The most dra_ti.c impact of government policies in this period
is io the d_cliue iu nominal protection to producers and _he transi-
tion from implic_,t t_x_.tion to implicit sobsidization of sugar
consumers(Table 3). On average, producers received only percent
of the world price during this period while consumers paid only
69 percent of the world price. These averages, however, conceal
large fluctuations i_ nominal protection rates and impl, ici_ tariffs
during the period due to large changes in world prices. Producer
_=d censumer prices were above _orld prices i_ three years out of
seve_. In 1982 and 1983 producer prices are again above world
prices (Figure 5).
Of the various arg_,ments for the govermment takeover of domestic
and in=ernational _arket_ng, three _re the most common--government
control• reduces the variability in prices facing consumers and
producers, makes it possible to negotiate favorable long term
contracts_ and rmises the average prie_ producers earn. It is
useful to examine each of these arguments in turn.
Reduction of Price Variation
Price variability affects consumers and producers of sugar in
opposit_ ways. Both face =ielative price effects (a sugar price
decline makes o_her comnloditi.es relatively more expensive and• v.... 23a
FIGURE _
Produc:er,Consumer_ and Werld S.ugarPrices, !.974+to_.=_8_
--------------- International Sugar ,Orga+J:_iz_tion World _riee
+----- ------ +W'nolesaledelivered Manila
...... Mi!Igate
1974 1975 1976 1977 _978 1979 1980 1981 198,2
YEAR.
Souse.e: Appenc_x table.GCN 2_
makes sugar less profitab]le than other crops) and income eff_c_:s
(arki.ncr_:as_:in the sugar pri.ee reduces the real income of sugar
consumers and increases tbe r_al income of producers)_ Consumers
__ke tbeJ.r buying decisions base_ on the cur_'ent price a_d are
_herefore able _o adjust thmir purchases to an unexpected aha_,ge in
'thep_ice. Producers, on the other hand_ _mke their planti_:_g
decisions on the bmsis of expected price_ not the ,_.ctu_l. pric_ at
hazvest time.
It is not sufficient that ';:here he social benefits from
stabi.lization_ the benefits must 'De greater than the social comt_
of running the stabiliz_.ti.on policy. Probably the la:¢gest cost
is the epportunit_ cost of the foreign _.xcha_ge loans m_mdm by _.he
government t.ocover the: period whe_ e:q_ort prices are below
producer prices,. P.oughiy US$376 million were borrow_.d between
1977 and 1979 to su.bsid:i,..ze producers during this period, _l:_._:lut one:
arLda half times tbe va_t._eof annual sugar exports in 'chr._.se year_
Much has been written in the economice literature i.n the last
eight years about the impact of consume"<'price stabilization o._
consumer welfare, but :few definitive conclusions bare been r:_ac_-e,_.
Probably the most that can he said :[.s; that if there are gains, they
arise more from the impact on real income variability than on pri<,e
variability. Th_s stabilization of wildly fluctuating rice prices
_,_oul,d increase consumer welfare in the Phi!ippi.'_esmore t.han
_tabi, l:i.zati.on of wildly fluctuating sn_,ar prices because rice
p_,_rehasesa_:e a l.srger share of exDenditures than ._;uga';:.C, CN 25
Three potentia_ gains on the p_oduc.er side exist, a_l of
which arise because of divergences between private and E_ocial
pxofitability. One possibility is that capital marketm are
distorted so that the profitability of lending to sugar _ro%yers
is greater than the opportunity cost of capital_ but because of
the distortion, lenders won't supply c_pital to sugar growers.
in this case, producers are forced to rely on their o,en financial
resources in times when prices are Io_ and produce belG_ the _:_ptimal
level. Another possibility is that producers are more risk averse
than socially optimal and again produce toc_ little. A final
possibilityt related to the second, is that because of price
variability_ producers adopt new technology at a rate slower than
the optimum.
Although it is possible to construct theoretical situations
based on these divergences between social and private returns_ it
has bee_ difficult to identify them ei_pirical!y for at_ crop or
country. It seems especially unlikely that these di'_ergences
would be relatively more important in sugar than in other agricul-
tural crops in the Philippines. Sugar producers are a_ng the
iargemt and most con_ercial of agricultural entrepreneurs_ They
receive the bulk of all creditprovided to the agricultural sector,
use a quarter of all fertilizer in the country and o_nn a large
,umber of the agricultural machines in the Philipp_,nes. There is
little evidence that producers of sugar are excessively risk averse or
that decreases in sugar price fluctuations would increase averageGCN 26
sugar production. Thus i{ is not clear the_:many benefits arise
when the government uses its scarce foreign exchange borrowing
capacity to stabilize either consunJer or producer sugar prices.
Improved Bargainin_Pos_tion in the E:'_ort Market
The decision of NASUTRA to make long term contracts in 1980
h._s proven to be an. excellent one. Shortly after the contracts
were made, world market prices fell precipitously. As a result,
Filipino producers enj6yed prices in 1982 and will enjoy prices
in 1983 roughly double the free market price.
%_e record over the whole period of government control of
marketing is not so favorable_ During the period Ig74 to 1980, the
average unit value of Philippine exports was somewhat less than the
average world price. Furthermore, during the Philex period, export
quantities a1_d prices were inversely correlated. Record stocks
were accumulated when world prices were at their hi_est (1974) 16
and record quantities were expor_:ed when world prices were at their
lowest (19_7). Thus over the whole period of government control,
export prices have bee_ some:what above world prices on average
but of three critical export contract ]ecisions, two were made
incorrectly; stocks were built up rather than drawn down when
world prices were high, and stocks were sold _en prices were low.
There are two reasons why government control of exporting
might be desirable~-to optimal1$ restrict export supply, and to_CN 2_
_k_advantaKe of economies of scale in gatherin_market i.ufor_at_on.
If the world demand for Philippine s_zgar is downward s],oping, that
is, Philippine exports have some impa._t on world prices_ then it is
theoretically possible to reduce Philippine e_qports, induce a rise
in world prices and increase export revenues_. It is unlikel.y b
however_ that Philippine exports have any lo_g run impact on world
markets. Free market trade is about 15 million tons and Philippine
exports are only o,_e million tons or a little over five percent.
Thus restricting exports does not seem a l_ke]_y _3_iy to increase
export _'evenues.,
:It is also difficul= to iwmgine why NASUTRA should be in e
better position to predict long run p.rj.ce ].evels than is the
private sector_ If the private sector were free to export_ it
should be able to develop the necessary expertise to Dredl,ct future
price&_ Even if for some reason NASU'YRA _ere abl_ to do a better
job of forecasting, it would nmke most sense for that information
tobe provided to the private sector to make its ow_, contract
decisions.
Ultir_tely, someone must decide when and how to sell sugar
abroad, No one is infallible and mistakes in judgment will
,_doubt_dly take place. If decision making is decentralized, th.e
costs of a wrong decision accrue only to the person who made the
! decision. If that decision making is concentrated in one organiza-
tion, the cost of a mistake, such as the decision by Philex to78
bu/.i,i,_p:_o.._.:. at a time of record world priceS, is incurred on
all sugar tra_}ed or that could have been traded,
Increased Prices to Producers
Unless the government wants to finance the subsidy todomestic
producers previously provided by the preferential access to the U.S.
market, the only way the government clln raise producer prices
relative to the world market is to either sell abroad or sell to
consumers at increased prices. Given the arguments above, it seems
u_likeiy that NASUTRA would be able to use market power to increase
long run export prices. Furthermore, if it could, the mechanism
would be reduced exports. Reduction in supply requires a drop in
domestic production quotas or paying producers lower prices.
It would be politically undesirable to raise consumer prices
solely to increase producer incomes and the evidemce suggests that
NASUTRA has not resorted tG this. in the !962 to 1.973period,
consumer prices were 14Opercent of the world price on average.
Between 1974 and 1980, consumer prices were only 69 percent of
world prices. The impact of government control has been to lower,
no_ raise, consumer prices. In order to finance this low consumer
price, the producer price has been kept below the world price.GCN 29
Sum.l_t r-,i
NASUYRA's good dacision in nmking long term contracts was
at least partially offset by Phi]ex bad decisions in timing of
export and stock acc,_ntlation. The Philippines •does•not control
a ._uff._.cient amount of world trad_ _o affect world p_ices.
Neither Philippine consumers nor producers appear to gain much
from price stabilization _ but consumers gain and producers lose
because the prices they. face have be_n kept•well below world
prices. It is not clear whether the gains ti_ consumers are offset
by the !os_es to producers. It thus•appears that either from a
theoretical or an empirical, standpoint, the long run overall gains
from government • control •of sugar marketing are not large, but that
there have been large income transfers from sugar producers to
sugar consumers.
(At the time .this paper vas reproduced_ the final sectien on
comparative advantage was not .yet complete. A supplementary
handout will be available at the Workshop.)GCN 3O
FOOTNOTES
IThe world free market includes all sugar not traded under
special government to government arrangements such as those between
Cuba and the European socialist countries. EC exports of s_sidized
sugar are to the free market, but its imports of sugar from ACP
countries are not from the free market.
2See Castro, 1965, for an extended discussion of the early
history of Philipplne-U.5. sugar relations.
3Sugar exporters were required to comvert a part of their foreign
exchange earnings to pesos at the old rate through 1965_
4The magnitude of the difference between consumer and world
prices depends upon the price at which sugar Could have been
imported into the Philippines. If the International Sugar
Organization world price is used domestic prices were 39
percent above world prices. If an average of Japanese, Hong Kong
and South Korea imported unit values are used as the world price,
domestic prices were only 18 percent higher.
5Consumer also lose the standard dead weight loss triangle abco
6This assumes that average revenues at QTOT are greater than
average costs and that production decisions are made with the U.S.
price as the marginal revenue. If producers base their production
decisions on a weighted average of PUS and PD, pr0duction will be
somewhat less.GCN 31
71n other words,•PUS is greater than the marginal cost when
production equals the Sum of the U.S. and domestic.quotas, These
quota rents must be seen as occurring _li.thinthe context of the
whole constellation, of Philippine and U.S, sugar policies. The
maximum rents could be earned by paying producers world prices
and if production was not sufficient to meet domestic demand and
the U.S, quota, buying foreign sugar to make up the difference. The
U.S., however, would not allow U.S, imports of non-Philippine
sugar to meet the Philippine quota, nor would it allow
Philippine imports of foreign sugar to meet Philippine domestic
demand and sales of Philippine sugar tomeet the U.S, quota. The
rents referred to in the text arise because, given the ban on
imports and the domestic sales requirement, producers want to sell
more sugar to the U.S, market than allowed by the U.S. quota,
8The molasses trade remained in the hands of the private
sectorl ,.
9Since 1974, the reserve has lost any practical significance
since control of allsugar is in government hands. Its price con-
tribution in the composite price is identical to the export price.
Reserve sugar is sometimes used to meet ISA stockholding commitments.
lOThe basic export tax was 6 percent. The new taxi called a
premium duty, was 20 percent of the difference between the CIF
price and a base price, Originally set equal to 80 percent of the
FOB value of exports for February 1974, The taxes applied to
centrifugal and refined sugar and molasses.GCN 32
Neither the export tax nor the prem4m d_y appear to have
been fully collected. The premium duty was paid only. in three
year_, 1974 to 1976. Between 1970 and 1977 total revenues from
export taxes averaged only 1.8 percent of the value of exports.
|!_2.78 billion were reportedly borrowed; F332 million from
the International Monetary Fund commodity price stabilization, fund,
•I.025 billion from the foreign banks, _1.3 billion in the form
of credit lines from the Philippine National Bank and .the Republic
Planters Bank, and an PI8 million.cred_tline from the Traders
Royal Bank (Sugar News, March 1981).
12These stocks were equal to 8 percent of total world exports
of sugar.
!3The authorization for Philsucom was contained in Presidential
Decree No. in 1974, but Philsucom was not organized until 1978. •
!4The planters/millers share of the export profit.was "
distributed in the following way.
First, the NASUTRA export costs.was calculated by adding a
margin of. _0_316 per kgo (_20/picul) to the export p rice component
of the composite price. The difference between the world.price and.
this export cost, called the export differentialT was shared
between NASUTRA and the millers/planters.
For example, for the 197911980 crop season, the following
• figures were used to calculate the basic composite price:GCN 33
Price • Percent share Contribution t.o
F i_. i.n the composite thecomposite
Export sugar 90 50 45,0
Domestic sugar II0 46 -50o6
Reserve sugar 90 4 3.6
Composite price .99.2
If the average export price were F200.per picul (approximately 45




less NASUTRA margin 20,0
export differential 89.8
W_th the initial sharing arrangement, fifty percent of P44.9 would
be added to the export price component of the Composite price and
the new composite price would be P121.65. The differential between
the two composite prices is split between millers and planters in
proportion to their production sharing arrangement.
15The president of NASUTRA, Ambassador Roberto Benedieto, is
also Chsirman of Philsucom and chairman of the Board of Directors
of the Republic Planters Bank which took over the bulk of
financial services for the sugar industry in 1978,• GCN 34
l6Apart of this accumulationwas undoubtedly due to the ban
on exports. The ban was designed to protectconsumers, but it is.
difficult to see why record stocks were necessary for that reason
alone.GCN _5
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APPEND IX TABLE
Select_:d Ra_,_ Sugar Prices,
(Peses per metric ton)
I 2 3 4 5
i_terna ti. ona 1
" Su_.,ar Organi- Philippine .Wholesale
za_ion World New York Export Del.ivewed
fear Price CIF Unit Value Manila Mill.gate-
9r, ' IA3 240 226 176 207 I.._5
1956 154 247 222 204 218
.q_. 227 253 236 261 243 1...,_7
1958 154 255 244 249 243
i.$59 131 253 238 227 232
1-960 138 256 249 22 i. 250
i961 119 253 259 301_ 325 -
1.962 623 436 441 3f_ 7 384
1,963 696 633 555 350 401
1964 492 539 550 334 422
_,_,_: _, 174 526 612 314 396 .:..._ ,._ ._
_966 151 548 527 408 479
I._.}67 161 572 562 395 489
1968 159 593 569 404 496
1969 275 6!2 589 547 572
1.970 478 950 897 602 709
1.97 _t 669 __114 998 607 823
1972 1,074 1,258 I,152 791 987
.[972'. !:. 401 i,442 I.,. 265 787 i,052'"
1974 4,453 4,258 3,250 826 I.,458
_97._ 3_244 3,567 4,298 1,060 .I ,955
• _.976 I,886 2_1'71 2,16S !_240 _,763
1.97"? I,323 1,79! 1,547 1,374 1,331
1.97_ I,275 2_?66 1,295 '1,439 1,423
'i!979 I,5'76 2,_33 i_362 i,739 1,568
11980 4_668 4,902 2,575 1,850 I,.953
• _ I,850 I,790
v 79"_ -" _' 660 1.981 ~'_ _ I., 8.50 _.:_
!1982 2,055 -Conn. Appendix'<TaSle,
F--em FAO,_
2,. .._l._].k r_._ s_.ga:.r_ lar-i, ed '_Te.,:,.;-Y::,rk *,_i.;.;h apglic_bi._ duties paid.
.7-. ._e v_!r_e "_: ::.e;.,-_._:r].fugal suger exports dl",;i_e(.._ by _n_
quantity_
4.. :_l'._olesaie '?-__'ic_ "_'-or _ju:g_'-_r (ordinario 97°) " "" ° " .. bas_s bu_'ars
e:×-central._ delivered Manila. For 1955 to 197$_ from
Philippine '.gouncilfor Agrie.r.:!ture and Re.,zo_rce.s
Research (1980), '"D_.'xSeri.'.!_::_ on Sugarcan.e St:_tistics .in
the Philippines." From 1979 to 1981, from Domestic
Marketing Office, NASUT_...
5. For !955 to 1973, s weighted averege of the ex:port prices
for s_gar,.. Victori,as ex_.warehouse, and the wholesale price
presented in t:oltgm: fo,_r. The weights are t.he s.bare of
produ.ztion being exported.and one minus _hat sb_:_re. F'_:om
1974 to 1980_ the composite price. Prices _nd prod:,',_c£ion
are for _he crop year ending in the year indicated, e._purP-s
are for the calendar year.